Eyewitness identification decisions are vulnerable to various influences on witnesses' decision criteria that contribute to false identifications of innocent suspects and failures to choose perpetrators. An alternative procedure using confidence estimates to assess the degree of match between novel and previously viewed faces was investigated. Classification algorithms were applied to participants' confidence data to determine when a confidence value or pattern of confidence values indicated a positive response. Experiment 1 compared confidence group classification accuracy with a binary decision control group's accuracy on a standard old-new face recognition task and found superior accuracy for the confidence group for target-absent trials but not for target-present trials. Experiment 2 used a face mini-lineup task and found reduced target-present accuracy offset by large gains in target-absent accuracy. Using a standard lineup paradigm, Experiments 3 and 4 also found improved classification accuracy for target-absent lineups and, with a more sophisticated algorithm, for target-present lineups. This demonstrates the accessibility of evidence for recognition memory decisions and points to a more sensitive index of memory quality than is afforded by binary decisions.
The criminal justice system often relies heavily on eyewitness identifications when assessing the likely guilt of a suspect. Sometimes, after viewing a crime, a witness will be asked to view a lineup. Lineup members may be presented one at time (sequential lineup) or all together (simultaneous lineup). A lineup may use live, videotape, or still photograph presentation. The witness is generally asked to either select the lineup member they believe to be the culprit or reject the lineup if they believe the culprit is not present. Thus, the eyewitness identification task shares properties with other decision-making tasks that require individuals to (a) condense complex information into a simple binary response and (b) base judgments on potentially unreliable information sources (e.g., memory). Unsurprisingly, therefore, the fallibility of eyewitness identification decisions is well established and identification test procedures have been closely scrutinized Innocence Project, 2007; Wells et al., 1998) . In this context, Wells, Memon, and Penrod (2006) recently commented, It could be argued that research has been profoundly conservative in its approach to the eyewitness-identification problem. Specifically, researchers have tended to operate within the confines of the traditional lineup, in which a suspect is placed among fillers and the eyewitness makes a verbal identification. But what if the lineup had never existed and the legal system turned to psychology to determine how information could be extracted from eyewitnesses' memories? . . . Operating from scratch, it seems likely that modern psychology would have developed radically different ideas. For instance, brainactivity measures, eye movements, rapid displays of faces, reaction times, and other methods for studying memory might have been developed instead of the traditional lineup. Once we step outside the confines of the traditional lineup, it is possible to imagine a future science of eyewitness evidence that is radically different from the methods used today. (pp. 68 -69) The experiments reported here represent one such departure from the traditional lineup. Ideally, an identification decision should reflect a comparison of individual lineup members with a witness's memory of the culprit. If the witness has a strong memory and finds a strong match between this memorial image and a lineup member, a positive identification should result. If the witness's memory is weak or the match is poor, the witness should reject the lineup. However, as Wells (1993) suggested, various other factors may influence witnesses' decisions. For example, the presence of authority figures and stimulus ambiguity at the identification test may result in conformity and compliance pressures, leading witnesses to lower their decision criterion, thereby increasing false identification rates from target-absent lineups. Similarly, a witness's decision criterion may be lowered if the witness expects the culprit to be present in the lineup. Alternatively, self-appraisals of memory efficacy and witnessing conditions or the apparent serious consequences of a positive identification could make a witness who finds a strong match to memory in the lineup reluctant to choose. In sum, witnesses' identification decisions are likely to be shaped by factors other than memory quality and the match between individual lineup members and the memorial image of the offender.
Modifying the eyewitness identification procedure so that the eyewitness expresses his or her confidence that each lineup member is the perpetrator provides an opportunity to assess the match between each lineup member and the eyewitness' memory of the perpetrator and may provide a more effective method of identifying a culprit among foils. Various theories of confidence processing suggest that for a binary decision where an individual is assessing whether a particular stimulus has been previously viewed, differences in the confidence estimates obtained for various stimuli should discriminate those previously seen from those previously unseen. For example, decisional locus theories such as strength and signal detection theory (SDT; e.g., Bernbach, 1971; Egan, Schulman, & Greenberg, 1959; Wickelgren & Norman, 1966) hold that confidence is a direct index of the degree of match between a given stimulus and an image in memory. Thus, the previously viewed culprit should elicit a higher degree of match than innocent (previously unseen) lineup members, with this reflected in a higher confidence estimate. Alternatively, postdecisional locus accumulator theories (e.g., Van Zandt, 2000; Vickers, 1979) suggest that a previously seen face (the perpetrator) should provide more evidence of having been previously seen than a previously unseen face (an innocent lineup member). Consequently, the difference between the accumulated evidence favoring the seen (i.e., the perpetrator) versus the unseen alternatives should be greater than those between previously unseen (i.e., innocent) lineup members. According to the balance of evidence hypothesis, this should be reflected in a higher confidence estimate being elicited for the perpetrator than for innocent lineup members.
The theories addressed above have potentially important implications for the applied setting, and our investigation of these implications tests the applicability of these theories to areas for which they certainly were not originally developed. More important, however, we now outline in detail how this work refines theorizing about metamemorial processes. The theories outlined above suggest that an eyewitness's decision and decision confidence result from a comparison of accumulated evidence with a decision criterion or criteria. If this is the case, then bypassing the decision criterion and directly accessing the accumulated evidence (i.e., through confidence) may provide diagnostic information free from the nonmemorial influences on criterion placement thought to distort eyewitness identification decisions. However, this research represents a sizable extension of basic decision-making, confidenceprocessing, and memory theory. A key feature of these theories (particularly SDT and accumulator models of decision making and confidence processing) is that they were designed to account for very simple decision-making phenomena. Thus, their application to recognition tasks involving complex facial stimuli represents a considerable leap. Nevertheless, supporting evidence comes from a series of word-recognition studies demonstrating the recognition without identification phenomenon (e.g., Cleary & Greene, 2000; Peynircioglu, 1990) . Across various tasks and encoding and test conditions, higher confidence ratings were consistently given to previously studied words than to nonstudied words, even when the presented word could not be identified, suggesting recognition occurred even in the absence of identification. In other words, confidence judgments provided evidence for old words that was not provided by the binary old-new decisions. A major focus of this article is the extent to which this information is accessible through confidence judgments alone (i.e., when no binary response is made).
SDT and accumulator models offer a broad, conceptual theoretical motivation for the present research. Other meta-cognition research-for example, work done on the feeling of knowing (i.e., the sense that target information is stored in memory despite its current inaccessibility) by Koriat (1993 Koriat ( , 1995 -clearly demonstrates that (a) participants have at least partial access to the retrieval information upon which memory-based decisions are made and (b) participants' assessments of this information can offer consistent predictive utility for future retrieval performance. Although the feeling of knowing and the retrospective confidence judgments for the present research are importantly distinct, there is a degree of overlap in the information upon which each is thought to be based. For example, the accessibility model of the feeling of knowing proposes that the recall of partial information and the amount of partial information recalled, the speed of retrieval or access, and the intensity of the information accessed all contribute to the strength and predictive utility of the feeling of knowing. Similarly, all of these factors could be expected to contribute to the strength and diagnostic value of confidence estimates generated by assessments of the degree of match between a presented stimulus and an individual's memory of a previously viewed stimulus; this match has previously been labeled ecphoric similarity (Tulving, 1981) . If this is the case, three successive possibilities follow. First, if the feeling of knowing can effectively predict future retrieval performance, confidence estimates may offer effective diagnostic information for the present recognition task. It is important to note that although Koriat's work deals predominantly with the feeling of knowing and future recall memory performance, previous work has demonstrated a link between the feeling of knowing and future recognition memory performance (for reviews, see Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1994; Schwartz, 1994) . Second, reliable diagnostic information may thus be accessible in the absence of a binary (seen, not seen) decision. Third, the diagnostic information afforded by the confidence procedure may be relatively insensitive to the social and environmental factors thought to influence identification decision criterion placement and, consequently, identification accuracy in the forensic setting.
If multiple confidence estimates can be used to discriminate previously seen from unseen faces, this research will provide a first step toward a theoretical understanding of the accessibility of the evidence upon which recognition decisions are made. Specifically, although Koriat's (1993 Koriat's ( , 1995 work demonstrates that accumulated evidence can be accessed to evaluate what participants think they will remember, ours demonstrates that this evidence can be accessed to discriminate items that participants presently do and do not recognize without them making a binary recognition judgment. Further, it builds on the psychophysical discrimination work using rating scales to demonstrate that ratings scales are also useful tools for discrimination tasks involving recognition memory.
Historically, the existence of a meaningful confidence-accuracy relation for eyewitness identification decisions has not been universally acknowledged by eyewitness researchers (Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 2001 ). However, three lines of evidence demonstrate that if participants positively identify a lineup member as the culprit (as opposed to rejecting the lineup) and if confidence is measured immediately after a decision is made (and before it is subjected to potentially distorting social biases such as feedback), confidence is meaningfully related to decision accuracy (Brewer & Wells, 2006; D. S. Lindsay, Read, & Sharma, 1998; Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995) . Further, these patterns exist even though the eyewitness paradigm typically requires binary responses and exposes participants to numerous nonmemorial factors that may influence decision criterion placement.
If confidence judgments are systematically related to ecphoric similarity, then confidence estimates generated for multiple stimuli may reliably discriminate previously seen from novel stimuli. Here we applied this approach to the eyewitness identification domain. First, using a basic face recognition paradigm, we established whether patterns similar to the recognition without identification phenomenon were detected for face recognition. Unlike the eyewitness identification paradigm that, if simulating the real-world situation, typically provides one data point per witness, the face recognition paradigm allows the collection of large amounts of data both within and between subjects and negates effects relating to the individual nature of the stimuli through the counterbalancing of stimuli between and within experimental conditions. Second, we used a face recognition mini-lineup task (cf. Weber & Brewer, 2004) , which presents identical faces at encoding and test, albeit in a lineup. Again, this permits large-scale data collection within and between subjects. Finally, we used a standard eyewitness identification paradigm, with a single encoded event and lineup for each witness (although encoding and test stimuli were not identical). Table 1 outlines the three experimental paradigms used. If we began with an eyewitness identification experiment and found that differences in confidence estimates did not differentiate previously seen from unseen faces, the absence of the expected effect could be attributed to a variety of differences between the word-recognition and eyewitness identification paradigms. By first adopting a basic face recognition task (which better resembles a word-recognition task), it can be established whether differences in confidence estimates can be used to discriminate previously seen from unseen stimuli for tasks involving faces rather than words.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we examined if confidence estimates discriminated old from new typical and distinctive faces, contrasting the performance of a confidence-rating group with the performance of a binary decision control group that performed a standard old-new recognition task. This two-stage process (i.e., obtaining a binary response followed by a confidence estimate) was used in Experiment 1 for the binary decision condition to provide a simplified approximation of the decision-making process required in the eyewitness identification paradigm. On the basis of the theoretical perspectives of confidence processing underpinning the present research, there are a number of reasons to believe that the distinctiveness of facial stimuli may have an important effect on the results obtained using the multiple confidence estimate procedure. As Brewer, Weber, and Semmler (2005) noted, the distinctiveness of facial stimuli is likely to affect aspects of both the encoding and the retrieval of stimuli. When compared with typical faces, distinctive faces are likely to generate stronger, clearer memory traces and be more readily retrieved from the memory store. Indeed, face recognition studies have demonstrated that facial distinctiveness affects both decision accuracy and decision latency (Ellis, Shepherd, Gibling, & Shepherd, 1988; Light, Kayra-Stuart, & Hollander, 1979; Semmler & Brewer, 2006) .
The theories of confidence processing outlined previously suggest that confidence is, at least to some extent, the result of a comparison between a presented stimulus and a memorial image of a previously presented stimulus. Thus, the extent to which the initial stimulus can produce a strong, clear, easily retrievable memory trace is likely to have an important effect on the confidence ratings elicited using the new procedure. Consistent with what Schacter and colleagues referred to as the distinctiveness heuristic (for a review, see Schacter & Wiseman, 2006) , when compared with typical faces, faces with more distinctive facial components should produce stronger, more readily accessible memorial images and should consequently generate higher confidence estimates for previously seen faces and lower confidence estimates for previously unseen faces. Thus, the difference between the confidence estimates elicited for previously seen and unseen faces should be greater for distinctive than for typical faces, facilitating improved classification accuracy.
Method
Participants. Sixty-four undergraduate students (34 men and 30 women) participated. Their ages ranged from 18 to 39 years (M ϭ 20.97 years, SD ϭ 4.37). For Experiment 1 and all following experiments, age and gender were equivalent across conditions.
Apparatus. The presentation of stimuli and instructions and the recording of responses were controlled by an IBM-compatible PC. Confidence assessments were entered using a keyboard, whereas old-new task and filler task responses were made using a mouse to click on-screen buttons.
Stimuli. Ninety-six color photographs of faces of male and female individuals, ranging from young adults to older adults, were used as stimuli. The individuals depicted in the photographs were predominantly of European descent. The faces used were (Martinez & Benavente, 1998) . Photographs were digitally cropped so as to only display the face, neck, and hairline of the individual. Photograph size, 200 ϫ 200 pixels displayed on a monitor with a resolution of 1.24 ϫ 768 pixels, was the same at both study and test. The photographs used in the present study have previously been sorted into two groups according to distinctiveness (distinctive and typical), with a comprehensive description of the categorization procedure available in Semmler and Brewer (2006) . Briefly, the method was as follows: 34 participants rated 122 female and 209 male faces on a 7-point distinctiveness rating scale (1 ϭ typical, 7 ϭ distinctive). Photographs were divided into three categories (distinctive, moderate, and typical) according to mean (and standard deviation) distinctiveness ratings. For the present study, we selected faces from only the distinctive and typical categories. To ensure that the faces included in the two categories did differ significantly in distinctiveness, we permitted no overlap in distinctiveness ratings between categories. That is, the most typical-rated distinctive face was still rated significantly more distinctive than the most distinctive-rated typical face.
Design and procedure. In the present study, we used a 2 (condition: confidence vs. binary decision) ϫ 2 (distinctiveness: distinctive vs. typical) mixed design. Participants were randomly allocated to the confidence or binary decision condition, with 32 participants in each condition. Face type was varied within subjects, with each participant viewing an equal number of distinctive and typical faces.
After arriving at the laboratory, participants were informed that the experiment consisted of two blocks: Each block consisted of a study series of photographs and a test series of photographs, separated by a visual memory task. The study phase of each block contained an equal number of distinctive and typical face stimuli, and presentation order was counterbalanced. Participants clicked a Next button to begin the experiment. Participants were instructed to pay close attention to the photographs they were about to see, as they would be questioned on them later. Participants clicked Next and viewed the first series of photographs. Each photograph was presented for 500 ms with a 500-ms interval between stimuli. An interval of 500 ms was selected to prevent floor and ceiling effects (Weber & Brewer, 2004) .
After viewing the first series of photos, a screen appeared informing participants that they were now required to work on a visual memory (filler) task. Participants clicked Next and worked on a visual memory task for 3 min. The visual memory task presented participants with a black-and-white matrix for 3 s. The matrix was then removed for 3 s before being returned with one cell changed from black to white. Participants were instructed to identify which cell had changed color. This process was repeated for 3 min. The computer controlled the rate of presentation to ensure that all participants completed an equal number of trials. The task was used to provide some poststimulus interference during the retention interval. Participants were then informed that they would view another series of photographs, some of which were present in the previous series and some of which were not.
Participants in the confidence condition were asked, for each face they were about to see, to rate their confidence that this face was presented during the study phase of this block. Participants in both conditions entered their confidence ratings by typing a number (0 -100%) in a designated on-screen space and hitting the Enter key on the keyboard. No other instructions on the interpretation of the confidence scale were given to the participants, and no physical scale was presented to participants. After entering a confidence rating, participants clicked Next and were presented with the next face in the series. This continued until participants had viewed and provided confidence ratings for every face in the series.
Participants in the binary decision condition were asked, for each face they viewed, to indicate whether this face was presented earlier by clicking an on-screen button (Yes or No). After making their "Yes" or "No" response, participants were asked to rate their confidence in the accuracy of their response. After providing a confidence rating, participants clicked Next to view the remaining faces in the series. This process continued until participants had viewed, made a "Yes" or "No" response, and provided a confidence rating for each face in the series.
Once participants had viewed the entire second series of photographs, they were informed that they would now begin the second block of the experiment and would be shown another series of faces, none of which had been presented in the first block. The procedure for the second block of the experiment was identical to that for the first. Two blocks of trials were used to enable the collection of many data points per participant while avoiding floor and ceiling effects (Weber & Brewer, 2004) .
Results
An alpha level of .05 was used for all inferential analyses and effect sizes were measured using Cohen's f. The cutoff values for small, medium, and large effects are .10, .25 and .40, respectively. Where simple effects analyses were conducted, the measure of effect size adopted was Cohen's d, with cutoff values double those for Cohen's f, and a Bonferroni-corrected alpha level of .01 was set.
Determining classification accuracy for the confidence condition required that a criterion be established to determine when a confidence estimate could be construed as indicating a positive ("old") response. Following Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) , the confidence criterion that maximized the combined proportion of both correct "old" and "new" responses (i.e., fit ratio) was determined for each participant. Confidence ratings equaling or exceeding this criterion were classified as "old" responses, and those falling below the criterion were classified as "new" responses. Separate criteria were calculated for distinctive (across participants, M ϭ 56.94, SD ϭ 30.55) and typical (M ϭ 57.38, SD ϭ 31.05) face trials for each individual participant. It is important to note, as per Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) , that these critical values were derived from participants' data; they were not designated by the experimenters. For each trial, it was determined whether the relevant confidence estimate indicated a positive or negative response. Thus, each participant's trial-by-trial accuracy and subsequent overall mean accuracy were determined. The mean accuracy rates for the confidence and binary decision groups are provided in Table 2 .
A 2 (target presence) ϫ 2 (distinctiveness) ϫ 2 (condition) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) found a significant effect of distinctiveness on accuracy, F(1, 62) ϭ 200.08, f ϭ 0.47, with higher classification accuracy for distinctive than for typical faces. A significant effect of target presence, F(1, 62) ϭ 13.01, f ϭ 0.30, reflected higher accuracy for target-absent than for target-present trials. There was no significant effect of condition, but there was a significant Condition ϫ Target Presence interaction, F(1, 62) ϭ 13.21, f ϭ 0.31. Simple effects analysis indicated superior targetpresent accuracy rates for the binary decision condition, t(62) ϭ 2.48, d ϭ 0.63, but superior target-absent accuracy for the confidence group, t(62) ϭ 3.27, d ϭ 0.83. The significant Condition ϫ Target Presence ϫ Distinctiveness interaction, F(1, 62) ϭ 4.81, f ϭ 0.13, revealed effects consistent with the Condition ϫ Target Presence interaction for typical faces, t(62) ϭ 2.53, d ϭ 0.64, and t(62) ϭ 3.67, d ϭ 0.99, for target-present and target-absent trials, respectively. For distinctive faces, no significant differences were found between conditions in either target-present or target-absent accuracy, t(62) ϭ 1.50, d ϭ 0.38, and t(62) ϭ 1.76, d ϭ 0.45, respectively. As false alarms have been identified as a major factor in wrongful convictions, the large increase in target-absent accuracy was encouraging, despite a (smaller effect size) decline in target-present accuracy.
Accuracy was also analyzed according to response or classification type. The central question here is, Can participant confidence ratings be used to effectively classify presented items as either previously seen or unseen? In the forensic setting, it is not known whether a lineup is target present or target absent, and assessments of likely guilt are based, at least in part, on the identification information provided by witnesses. Thus, comparing accuracy according to response between conditions speaks to the potential forensic value of the identification information provided by the two procedures. Although confidence group participants did not provide explicit positive or negative responses, confidence estimates were used to make positive or negative classifications (permitting an analysis of accuracy according to response type). A 2 (response: old vs. new) ϫ 2 (distinctiveness: distinctive vs. typical) ϫ 2 (condition: binary decision vs. confidence) mixed ANOVA (see Table 3 ), with condition as the between-subjects variable, found a small but significant main effect of response, F(1, 62) ϭ 9.73, f ϭ 0.13, with greater accuracy for "old" responses than for "new" responses. Again, a significant main effect of distinctiveness, F(1, 62) ϭ 183.70, f ϭ 0.53, pointed to greater 
Discussion
This experiment demonstrates that for a simple recognition task, participants were able to access the information upon which recognition decisions are based and could do so without making a binary decision. Further, the results suggest that this evidence provides more diagnostic information than is afforded by the traditional binary decision. The informational value of a decisionmaking procedure is traditionally evaluated in one of two ways. The first method determines the proportion of trials for which a correct response is given. The second method examines accuracy rates according to response type: determining the proportion of positive and negative responses that are accurate. Experiment 1 used both comparison types. After the development and application of classification criteria, the accuracy rate for the confidence procedure was encouraging. This was particularly so for the targetabsent accuracy rate because mistaken identifications are known to play a major role in wrongful convictions (Innocence Project, 2007) . Less encouraging was the disadvantage in target-present accuracy, compared with the binary decision condition, for the confidence procedure for typical face trials. This result is, however, offset by two other findings. First, the disadvantage in target-present accuracy was not observed for distinctive face trials. Second, the disadvantage in confidence group target-present accuracy was accompanied by an advantage, compared with the binary decision condition, in the accuracy rate for positive responses. Further, this superiority in positive response accuracy was not accompanied by any corresponding disadvantage in the accuracy rates for negative responses.
Part of the impetus behind the present program of research comes from the idea that identification decisions (particularly positive identification decisions) made in the forensic setting are likely to be swayed by biasing environmental factors. The confidence procedure attempts to improve the diagnostic value of identification information by reducing the potential for environmental biases to influence a witness's response criterion. In the applied setting, it is obviously unknown whether a lineup contains the target, and appraisals of suspect guilt often rely heavily on the information provided by witnesses. Thus, despite this paradigm's lack of ecological validity, it is particularly encouraging to see that the confidence procedure has the potential to improve the accuracy, and therefore the informational value, of positive classifications.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we investigated whether multiple confidence estimates discriminated a target among foils in a face recognition mini-lineup (cf. Weber & Brewer, 2004) . Like the basic recognition paradigm, face recognition mini-lineups present participants with a series of still photographs of faces at study. Participants are then tested with a series of four-person mini-lineups in which (as in Experiment 1) the target is identical at encoding and test. However, this task involved associative recognition, with participants judging whether a particular pair of stimuli were presented together in the study phase rather than just assessing the familiarity of a single stimulus. In the forensic setting, it is desirable that identification information provided by witnesses be based, at least in part, on the retrieval of context-specific information rather than solely on the nonspecific familiarity of a lineup member. For example, upon viewing a lineup, a lineup member might simply seem familiar to me, or I might distinctly remember previously encountering this person, who was wearing a Cleveland Browns jacket at the time, in the parking lot outside a convenience store last Friday night.
Following Weber and Brewer (2006) , each face presented at study, and mini-lineup presented at test, was accompanied by a word cue. In each test phase, participants were presented with a mini-lineup containing four faces, each again accompanied by a word cue. Participants were required to determine whether any of the faces in the mini-lineup were presented with the word cue in the study phase. This design resulted in three potential trial types. Target-present trials presented a previously seen face with the correct word cue (and three previously unseen faces). This was the only trial type for which an "old" response was correct. Half of the target-absent trials presented a previously seen face with an incorrect word cue (and three previously unseen faces). The other half of the targetabsent trials presented a word cue and four previously unseen faces. The associative recognition task used in Experiment 2 did not ask participants if a face had been presented at study; rather, it asked if a face had been paired with the relevant cue at study. Thus, a simple, nonspecific index of stimulus familiarity would be insufficient to complete this task accurately.
Progression to a lineup-type task introduces a number of concerns for the multiple confidence procedure: specifically, anchoring and bias effects. Anchoring refers to the possibility that, within trials, confidence ratings for the first faces in a lineup located at either extreme of the confidence scale may distort later confidence estimates (cf. Gescheider, 1988) . Bias refers to the possibility that, independent of anchoring effects, the confidence estimate for a given face may be influenced by faces previously presented in the lineup (cf. Geiselman, Haight, & Kimata, 1984) . In Experiment 1, where participants viewed a series of single faces, any number of which could have been previously seen, previously viewed faces and previously provided confidence estimates were unlikely to impact on current trials. However, for mini-lineup and lineup tasks where the participant is aware that, at most, only one of the faces presented will have been previously seen, anchor and/or bias effects may be important. To deal with these possibilities, in Experiment 2, we presented lineup members simultaneously and allowed participants to alter their confidence estimate for each stimulus in the lineup as many times as they wished before submitting their responses.
Method
Participants, apparatus, and stimuli. One hundred twentyeight undergraduate students (45 men and 83 women) participated. Participant ages ranged from 16 to 61 years (M ϭ 21.84 years, SD ϭ 7.27).
1 The presentation of stimuli and instructions and the recording of responses were all done in the same manner as Experiment 1. Each mini-lineup consisted of one row of four faces centered on the screen, with the word cue located above. Binary decision condition participants were also presented with a Not Present button at the bottom of the screen.
Lineup construction. The mini-lineups used in this experiment were constructed using the following process. All of the faces in our database were rated on six dimensions (gender, face shape, hair color and style, eye color, skin color and complexion, and age) by four individuals who did not participate in Experiment 2. A description, agreed on by at least three of the four raters, was generated for each face. These descriptions were used to group the faces into 40 groups of five faces. A target and target replacement were randomly selected for each set of five faces. The 40 sets were divided into two groups (one group for name cues and one group for occupation cues) containing an equal number of male and female faces in each.
Design and procedure. Experiment 2 used a 2 (condition: confidence vs. binary decision) ϫ 2 (target presence: target present vs. target absent) mixed design, with participants randomly allocated to the confidence or binary decision condition. Cue type was varied within subjects, with each participant completing a block of trials for each cue type (common names matched to gender and occupations). Each block consisted of a study phase displaying 20 faces, each accompanied by a cue, a filler task identical to that used in Experiment 1, and a test phase consisting of 20 trials displaying a cue and an accompanying mini-lineup. In each block, participants viewed an equal number of target-present and targetabsent mini-lineups.
The procedure for Experiment 2 was similar to that described for Experiment 1, with two important exceptions. First, each face in the study phase was presented with a cue. Participants were informed that they would need to remember which face was presented with each cue but that they were not required to memorize each cue as cues would be presented during the test phase. During the study phase, each cue appeared 2 s prior to its accompanying face, and the cue and face were then presented together for 1 s. For example, in a name cue trial, the participant viewed the name cue John for 2 s before a male face appeared, and the two stimuli were presented together for 1 s. Cues were presented prior to faces to ensure that (a) cues received enough attention to be encoded and (b) cue encoding did not detract attention from face encoding. Second, rather than presenting a series of single faces during the test phase, each test phase trial presented participants with a four-person mini-lineup accompanied by a cue. For example, in an occupation cue trial, the participant was presented with the word cue Butcher accompanied by four lineup members. Occupation cues were not gender specific (e.g., the occupation cue Butcher may have been presented with a male or female face at study). However, at test, gender was always the same across lineup members and always matched gender at study.
Binary decision condition participants were required to decide whether any face in the lineup had been presented with the given cue during the study phase. Participants clicked the photo of the relevant lineup member to indicate that this face had accompanied the cue during the study phase or clicked Not Present to indicate that no lineup member had been presented with the relevant cue at study. The Not Present option represents a departure from a traditional four-alternative forced-choice design. Confidence group participants were required, for each face in the mini-lineup, to provide a confidence estimate indicating their confidence that this face had been presented with the relevant cue at study.
As mentioned, Experiment 2 produced three types of trials. A lineup could only be considered target present if one of the faces had been paired with the current word cue at study. Half of the target absent lineups presented at test included a face presented at study, a nonmatching word cue, and three previously unseen faces, whereas the other half included four previously unseen faces and a word cue. Participants were instructed about the possible occurrence of all three trial types. Participants in both conditions were informed that no faces would appear in both the name-and the occupation-cue blocks. The pairing of faces with cues during study, the pairing of cues with mini-lineups during test, and the order of presentation of blocks and trials within blocks were counterbalanced.
Results
The classification criterion for Experiment 1 needed only to determine a value that, if exceeded or equaled by a single confidence estimate, indicated an "old" response. For each trial, the criterion asked a single question: Is this confidence estimate high enough to constitute a positive classification? Each Experiment 2 trial required a confidence rating for each of the four stimuli. Thus, the classification criteria for Experiment 2 needed to address two queries. First, does this trial contain a single highest confidence estimate, indicating a lineup member who best matches the participant's memory of the target? If not, the trial received a negative classification (i.e., the lineup was rejected). If a single highest confidence value was present, the second question asked was, Is this confidence estimate large enough, relative to the other confidence estimates in this trial, to merit a positive classification? These two questions reflect the idea that, to be useful in a lineup setting, a classification algorithm must be able to identify which lineup member best matches the witness's memory for the perpetrator and determine whether this option is favored over the alternatives by an extent large enough to constitute a positive identification. Requiring the presence of a single max value to make a positive classification represents a conservative test for the confidence procedure. In the forensic setting, it is possible that multiple max values may lead to reliable positive classifications. For example, if two lineup members (one of whom was the suspect whereas the other was known to be innocent) received confidence ratings of 90%, whereas all other lineup members received confidence estimates below 10%, this may reliably indicate suspect guilt. Alternatively, such a pattern may suggest that the witness's memory of the culprit is weak. This example is only provided to demonstrate that the criteria used thus far are designed to be conservative and, thus, that they may not make full use of all the diagnostic information available.
Four potential classification algorithms were applied to participants' confidence estimates to determine overall classification accuracy rates. The max confidence value refers to, where present, the single highest confidence estimate provided for each lineup. All four criteria required the presence of a max confidence value and assumed that, once the criterion had been reached, the max confidence value indicated the participant's selection. The absence of a max value constituted a lineup rejection. All classification criteria collapsed the four confidence values obtained for each trial into a single, critical value. Criteria were then applied to participant confidence estimates in the manner described for Experiment 1. The first classification criterion (C1) maximized the fit ratio using max confidence values. C2 was based on the difference between the max value and the second highest confidence value (max -next best). Adding a second assumption that there would be some level of uniformity in the low confidence estimates generated by unseen faces, two more algorithms were developed: C3 was calculated by subtracting the mean of the three non-max confidence estimates from the max (max -M others ) and the value for C4 was the variance in non-max confidence values (var others ). For C4, a positive classification required (a) that there be a max confidence value and (b) that the variance in non-max confidence scores be below a criterion value. As in Experiment 1, a critical value was calculated for each participant (M ϭ 71.48, SD ϭ 25.19) and applied to each trial to determine classification type and accuracy. A repeated-measures ANOVA 2 on overall accuracy (see Table 4 ) for the four criteria showed a main effect, F(3, 189) ϭ 56.78, f ϭ 0.31, and pairwise t test comparisons found the overall accuracy rates for C3 to be superior (although effect sizes were, for the most part, very small, reflecting the high correlation between the accuracy rates generated using the four criteria) to those for C1, p Ͻ .05 and d ϭ 0.06; C2, p Ͻ .01 and d ϭ 0.07; and C4, p Ͻ .001 and d ϭ 0.74.
A 2 (condition) ϫ 2 (target presence) mixed ANOVA compared accuracy rates for the binary decision condition with those of the best confidence group classification criterion (C3). We do not suggest there is anything inherently advantageous about C3. Rather, it was selected for our comparison solely because, of the four criteria tested, it appeared to provide the best level of classification accuracy. The significant main effect of target presence, F (1, 126) As for Experiment 1, a 2 (condition: binary decision vs. C3) ϫ 2 (response: old vs. new) mixed ANOVA, with condition as the between-subjects variable, analyzed classification accuracy according to response. The significant interaction between condition and response, F(1, 126) ϭ 44.42, f ϭ 0.34, and subsequent simple effects analysis found that, as in Experiment 1, the accuracy rate for "old" responses was greater for the confidence (M ϭ .76, SD ϭ .15, 95% CI ϭ .73-.80) than for the binary decision condition (M ϭ .63, SD ϭ .16, 95% CI ϭ .59 -.67), t(126) ϭ 4.88, d ϭ 0.87. However, the accuracy rate for "new" responses in the binary decision condition was superior to the accuracy rate in the confidence condition (M ϭ .71, SD ϭ .12, 95% CI ϭ .68 -.74, and M ϭ .67, SD ϭ .09, 95% CI ϭ .64 -.69, respectively), t(126) ϭ 2.42, d ϭ 0.43. The main effect of response was nonsignificant, F(1, 126) ϭ 0.11, f ϭ 0.02.
Discussion
Four aspects of the results reported for Experiment 2 merit discussion. First, this experiment demonstrates the accessibility and diagnostic value of accumulated recognition information (in the absence of a binary decision) for tasks involving associative recognition and for tasks presenting multiple facial stimuli at test.
2 A Greenhouse-Geisser correction (Field, 2005) was applied to counter a violated assumption of sphericity. The effect remained significant, p ϭ .001.
3 When separate analyses were conducted incorporating each of the two target-absent trial types (to specifically test performance on the associative component of the task), the results paralleled those reported for data collapsed across target-absent trial type (despite an overall drop in accuracy associated with an increase in task difficulty). For ease of reporting and comprehension, only results collapsed across target-absent trial type are presented. Second, as in Experiment 1, after the application of a classification criterion, the confidence procedure produced a marked reduction in false positive classifications from target-absent lineups compared with the binary decision condition. However, despite comparable overall classification accuracy across conditions, in Experiment 2, the confidence procedure resulted in a significant disadvantage in target-present accuracy compared with the binary decision condition. This decline in target-present accuracy is potentially problematic. However, in later experiments, a more sophisticated algorithm succeeds in improving target-present performance using the confidence procedure. Third, given the obvious relevance of context-specific information in the applied setting and the difficulty of the task, it is encouraging to note that the confidence procedure discriminated a previously seen face presented with a matching cue from a previously seen face presented with a mismatched cue. Fourth, consistent with the results reported previously, when accuracy data were analyzed according to response, the confidence procedure resulted in superior accuracy for positive classifications. However, unlike previously reported results, for Experiment 2, this superiority in chooser accuracy was accompanied by a (smaller) disadvantage in nonchooser accuracy.
Experiment 3
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate that multiple confidence estimates can discriminate between previously seen and unseen faces and, after the application of a classification algorithm, provide classification accuracy rates comparable to a standard yes-no recognition task. Experiment 2 shows that multiple confidence estimates can differentiate previously seen from unseen stimuli for associative, as well as simple, recognition tasks. Given these promising findings, in Experiment 3, we examined whether similar patterns are detected using the eyewitness identification paradigm.
There are potentially important differences between the face recognition and eyewitness identification paradigms. Face recognition tasks typically present participants with identical images at encoding and test. However, the stimuli used in eyewitness tasks often differ considerably between these stages. Hair style, facial expression, and clothing are likely to vary. Given that confidence is thought to reflect the degree of match between a test stimulus and an image in memory, the magnitude of any observed effects may vary considerably from those reported in Experiment 2.
Another difference relates to the nature of the classification criteria that can be used with each paradigm. All criteria calculated thus far were based on within-subjects analyses of data, with separate criteria calculated for each participant. Criteria calculated within subjects may negate important effects related to individual differences in participants' interpretation and application of the confidence scale. This may be particularly relevant given that eyewitnesses are generally only asked to attempt a single identification. Consequently, in Experiment 3, we used a betweensubjects design in an attempt to establish a single criterion that can be applied to all participants and test the efficacy of this criterion in discriminating previously seen from unseen stimuli across a variety of encoding and test conditions. A between-subjects criterion enhances the potential effects of idiosyncrasies in participants' confidence data (e.g., Blais, Thompson, & Baranski, 2005) but is an essential step in the examination of the new procedure. The forensic utility of the multiple confidence procedure depends on its ability to provide consistent results across participants and across a wide variety of stimulus events. Experiment 3 used four videos of simulated crimes, together with associated lineups that produce quite different identification response patterns for both target-present and target-absent lineups in standard eyewitness identification tasks. Each participant viewed one of the four videos, with half of the participants viewing a target-present lineup and half viewing a target-absent lineup.
Method
Participants and apparatus. Four hundred eighty undergraduate students (185 men and 295 women) participated. Participant ages ranged from 16 to 63 years (M ϭ 22.89 years, SD ϭ 6.82). The presentation of instructions and the recording of responses were done in the same manner outlined for Experiments 1 and 2. The stimulus videos and lineups were also presented on a computer. Experiment 3 included a pencil-and-paper filler task between the presentation of the crime and the lineup.
Stimulus events. All movie clips used in this experiment have been previously used in published and unpublished research in our laboratory. Clip A began with a young Caucasian man dressed in a pizza delivery uniform approaching a residence. The man removed a screen from a front window and entered the residence. After a period of time, the man reemerged through the window carrying a video cassette recorder and left the premises. The offender was in view for 29 s with a full or partial view of his face available for 9 s. Archival data for this stimulus set showed accuracy rates of 75.6% for target-present lineups and 43.8% for target-absent lineups, with a choosing rate of 73.5%.
Clip B showed a young Caucasian man attempting to break into a car in the driveway of a residential address. The offender was then confronted by an off-camera person and fled the scene. The offender was shown for 14 s with frontal or profile views of his face available for 8 s. Archival accuracy rates for this stimulus set are 62.6% and 33.6% for target-present and target-absent lineups, respectively. The choosing rate is 74.2%.
Clip C began with a middle-age Caucasian man entering a bank and approaching a teller (who was off-screen at all times). The offender handed the teller a piece of paper and a brown paper bag, instructed the teller to follow the instructions, and waited as the teller filled the brown paper bag with money. The teller handed the bag back to the offender, who then turned and left the building. The offender was visible for 42 s with his face in view for 37 s. On the basis of archival data, target-present and target-absent accuracy rates are 34.4% and 69.8%, respectively, with a choosing rate of 53.1%.
Clip D showed a young Caucasian woman walking around a supermarket. The target passed the camera and turned down an aisle. The target stopped, picked an item off the shelf, and examined it before placing the item in her handbag. The target then turned and walked away from the camera to the end of the aisle. The target is on camera for 43 s with a full view of her face available for 9 s. Archival accuracy rates for this stimulus set are 23.5% and 60.2% for target-present and target-absent lineups, respectively, with a choosing rate of 44.1%.
The lineup photo display size was also identical to that in Experiments 1 and 2. Each lineup consisted of eight faces, centered on the screen in two rows of four faces. Binary decision condition par-ticipants were also presented with a Not Present button at the bottom of the screen.
Design and procedure. Experiment 3 used a 2 (condition: confidence vs. binary decision) ϫ 2 (target presence: target present vs. target absent) ϫ 4 (move clip) between-subjects design. Participants were randomly allocated to 1 of the 16 cells.
Participants viewed one of four movie clips on a computer screen, worked on a pencil-and-paper puzzle task for 25 min, and were then presented with a simultaneous eight-member lineup. To promote lineup fairness, we ensured the instructions given to participants were unbiased (clearly stating that the culprit may or may not be present in the lineup; Malpass & Devine, 1981) , and lineup foils were selected using a match-description strategy (Wells et al., 1998) to ensure that all lineup members conformed to a general physical description of the offender. The position of lineup members was determined randomly across the eight lineup positions for each participant. Binary decision condition participants completed a standard eyewitness identification task, clicking the picture of the lineup member they believed to be the offender or clicking a Not Present button to indicate that they believed the lineup was target absent. After making their identification decision, participants were required to provide a confidence estimate of the accuracy of their decision. As in Experiment 2, participants in the confidence condition were asked to provide a confidence estimate for each lineup member reflecting their belief that said lineup member was the offender. The confidence estimate for each lineup member was entered in a box underneath the lineup member. Again, confidence estimates were free to vary from 0 to 100%, and participants were able to adjust their confidence ratings before concluding the trial. Once a confidence estimate had been entered for each lineup member and participants had finished editing their confidence estimates, participants clicked a Done button to end the experiment.
Results
Following Experiment 2, four classification criteria were developed and applied to the confidence group data (see Table 5 ). Criteria were calculated separately for each stimulus set and for all stimulus sets combined. No differences were found between the overall classification accuracy rates for the four classification criteria, 2 (1, N ϭ 480) ϭ 0.01-1.02, w ϭ 0.01-0.04. For consistency, C3 (max -M others ) was selected for comparison with the binary decision condition accuracy rates (see Table 6 ). The critical value for data collapsed across stimulus sets (i.e., the four movie clips and lineups) was 76.57. The critical values for each individual stimulus set were 77.14, 76.57, 82.86, and 70.71 for A, B, C, and D, respectively. As in the previous experiments, these criteria were derived from the data and were not designated by the experimenters. Unlike the previous experiments, these criteria were developed from between-rather than within-subjects data.
Separate 2 (condition) ϫ 2 (accuracy) chi-square analyses were performed for target-present and target-absent lineups. When data were collapsed across stimulus sets, no significant difference in classification accuracy was found for target-present lineups, 2 (1, N ϭ 240) ϭ 0.47, w ϭ 0.04. When target-present accuracy rates were analyzed for each stimulus set separately, again no significant difference was detected for A, C, and D. For Stimulus Set B, a medium-sized effect indicated superior target-present classification accuracy for the binary decision condition, 2 (1, N ϭ 60) ϭ 4.34, w ϭ 0.27. For all stimulus sets combined, target-absent classification accuracy was significantly higher for the confidence group than for the binary decision condition, 2 (1, N ϭ 240) ϭ 39.20, w ϭ 0.40. This pattern was observed for Stimulus Sets B, 2 (1, N ϭ 60) ϭ 24.75, w ϭ 0.64; C, 2 (1, N ϭ 60) ϭ 24.75, w ϭ 0.64; and D, 2 (1, N ϭ 60) ϭ 7.20, w ϭ 0.35, but not for Stimulus Set A, 2 (1, N ϭ 60) ϭ 1.67, w ϭ 0.17. Target-present accuracy was troubling for both procedures (standard and new). For the confidence group, this is highlighted by the fact that (as in Experiment 2) prior to the application of a criterion, the max confidence value identified the target in targetpresent lineups with greater frequency than did the eventual criterion for all stimulus sets. Note also that the majority of erroneous target-present classifications were incorrect rejections (50% or more of total target-present classifications for any stimulus set), which may mean that the striking target-absent accuracy reported for the confidence group is a by-product of an overzealous exclusion criterion. To be of use in the forensic setting, an identification procedure must identify the guilty as well as exculpate the innocent.
Nothing can be done to enhance target-present accuracy with a standard identification procedure. To improve target-present accuracy for the confidence procedure, we developed a new hierarchical classification algorithm. As with previously described algorithms, the hierarchical algorithm tested for the presence of a single highest max confidence value (the absence of which was taken to indicate a lineup rejection). Max values were present in approximately 80% of cases across stimulus sets. Relying on the presence of a single highest max confidence value when making positive classifications is a potential limitation of the new procedure. However, although a max value was not present for a significant number of trials and a negative classification was required by default, the mean choosing rate for participants in the binary decision condition was only 62% collapsed across stimulus sets. Further, previous field research has shown lineup rejections rates of approximately 50% (Pike, Brace, & Kynan, 2002) . Thus, given the current absence of effective postdictors of accuracy for negative responses (e.g., Brewer & Wells, 2006; Sporer et al., 1995; Weber & Brewer, 2004) , the proportion of cases for which potentially useful diagnostic information was available was still greater in the confidence condition than in the binary decision condition. Following Wells and Olson's (2002) demonstration that foil identifications provided exonerating information, when a max value was present, the new algorithm applied a separate criterion for cases in which the max value referred to the suspect versus a foil. In the forensic context, using appropriately developed singlesuspect lineups means that the foils in the lineup are known (in advance) to be innocent. By separating the suspect max values from the foil max values, we were thus able to use information that would be routinely available in the forensic setting to eliminate many potentially misinforming max confidence values from our analyses. As described below, we were then able to analyze these foil max values for potential exonerating value.
The criterion for cases in which the max value referred to the suspect was developed and applied in the manner previously outlined. The mean critical value for data collapsed across stimulus materials and for Stimulus Sets A, B, and C was 30.00, whereas for Stimulus Set D, the critical value was 10.00. If the max value exceeded or equaled the criterion, this was taken as a positive identification. Max values failing to exceed this criterion were classified as indeterminate responses. That is, although the max value was not large enough to indicate guilt, it did not necessarily denote innocence. For cases in which the max value referred to a foil, a sufficiently large max value was classified as an indication that the suspect was not the culprit. The critical values for this operation were 10 for data collapsed across all materials and 5, 20, 85, and 40 for Stimulus Sets A, B, C, and D, respectively. Again, all critical values were derived from the data. Foil max values failing to exceed this criterion were designated as indeterminate responses. To recap, the hierarchical algorithm first determined whether a max value was present. Cases in which there was no max value were treated as lineup rejections. Cases in which a max value was present were then separated according to whether the max value referred to the suspect or a foil. Suspect and foil max values were then compared with separate criteria. Suspect max values equaling or exceeding the relevant criterion were counted as positive identifications. Foil max values equaling or exceeding the relevant criterion were counted as lineup rejections. Suspect or foil max values falling below their criterion were treated as inconclusive responses. Thus, this algorithm results in one of three classifications: (a) the suspect is the culprit, (b) the suspect is not the culprit, or (c) inconclusive (inconclusive classifications were included in the denominator when calculating classification accuracy).
When using the hierarchical method, foil max values could not lead to positive identifications and, thus, the ideal comparison of the hierarchical algorithm with the binary decision condition would require that only suspect identifications from the binary decision condition be included (i.e., all foil identifications would be excluded). However, despite the high number of incorrect identifications from target-absent lineups observed for the binary decision condition, the low number of target-absent suspect identifications did not permit this comparison. Instead, we divided the total number of target-absent foil identifications by the number of lineup members (8). This value was used as an estimate of targetabsent suspect identifications. Our comparison of the hierarchical algorithm with the binary decision condition departs from previous accuracy rate comparisons in another important way. Foil identifications have exculpatory value and this raises the question of how they should be categorized when calculating accuracy. They cannot lead to miscarriages of justice (in an appropriate singlesuspect lineup), so they should not be classified as erroneous identifications. Thus, they may either be removed from accuracy calculations (typical in contemporary eyewitness identification literature) or be counted as lineup rejections (indications of suspect innocence). We have included foil identifications as lineup rejections. Although this treatment is atypical in both the applied setting and the extant literature, it provides the most stringent standard against which we can compare the informational value of the confidence procedure. Table 7 presents the classification accuracy rates for the binary decision group and the confidence group (hierarchical algorithm). Compared with the binary decision group, the confidence group, with the hierarchical algorithm method, had notably enhanced target-present accuracy (52% and 36% overall) with, for the most part, equivalent accuracy rates for target-absent trials (88% vs. 88% overall). This finding is particularly promising given the previously discussed potential problems associated with the development and application of a between-subjects criterion. Although there appears to be a large disadvantage for the new procedure in Stimulus Set C, target-absent accuracy, 11 of the 15 noncorrect classifications were indeterminate classifications. Thus, the number of misinforming classifications is lower than it initially appears. It is important to note that an inconclusive classification should be viewed as a legitimate indication that the information provided by the witness was insufficient to assess the suspect's likely guilt adequately and not as a failure by the new procedure. Note. For each cell, n ϭ 30. Prop ϭ proportion correct.
As for Experiments 1 and 2, we analyzed classification accuracy according to classification type to investigate whether participant confidence estimates could be used to discriminate effectively between previously seen and unseen stimuli. Table 8 displays the accuracy rates for the confidence (hierarchical algorithm) and binary decision groups for choosers and nonchoosers. As previously described, although confidence group participants did not make an explicit binary response, confidence estimates were used to make classifications and, thus, permitted an analysis of accuracy according to classification type. The hierarchical algorithm resulted in chooser accuracy rates that compared well with the rates of a very stringent binary decision condition for all stimulus sets combined and for each set individually. Nonchooser accuracy comparisons were a little more complex. Three of the four stimulus sets showed an apparent reduction in nonchooser accuracy for the confidence group compared with the binary decision group. However, when data were collapsed across materials, the confidence group appeared to provide superior nonchooser accuracy. This probably reflects an increase in criterion stability afforded by collapsing data across stimulus sets and quadrupling the number of data points used to determine the criterion value.
Discussion
Of primary importance, Experiment 3 demonstrates the accessibility and diagnostic value of the evidence upon which recognition judgments are based (in the absence of a binary response) for a complex recognition task using nonidentical target images at study and test. Experiment 3 also represents a successful application of the confidence procedure within an eyewitness identification paradigm. Further, compared with initial classification criteria, the application of a more sophisticated classification algorithm was found to improve target-present accuracy across the board with little cost, in general, to target-absent accuracy. More important, a similar pattern of results was observed when the accuracy rate of the hierarchical algorithm was compared with the classification accuracy of a very stringent comparison condition. The importance for the new procedure of effective classification across a variety of conditions has been outlined previously. Thus, despite fluctuating accuracy rates, it was encouraging to note the consistency of these patterns across targets.
Experiment 3 also demonstrates the successful development and application of a between-subjects classification criterion. The importance of the new procedure's applicability across a variety of crime types, lineups, viewing conditions, and witnesses has been previously stated. In Experiment 3, we aimed to test this generalizability, first by using varied crime and lineup stimuli and second by developing a single classification criterion that could be applied across participants. Separate between-subjects criteria were calculated for each of four varying stimulus sets, and yet another criterion was calculated for data collapsed across stimuli. In all cases, classification accuracy for the new procedure was encouraging when compared with very rigorous binary decision comparisons. This is particularly promising given that a between-subjects criterion is especially vulnerable to idiosyncratic use of the confidence scale. In addition to the practical importance of establishing the efficacy of a between-subjects criterion, these results raise a key theoretical issue. The success of the criterion is apparently at odds with the established effect of individual differences on postdecision confidence (e.g., Blais et al., 2005) . One explanation is that our algorithms were sufficiently robust to accommodate the idiosyncratic variance in confidence ratings. A potentially important alternative, however, is that by asking for confidence regarding a stimulusmemory match rather than confidence in the accuracy of a memorial decision, we circumvented the sources of individual differences in confidence. For example, cues such as fluency (Kelley & Lindsay, 1993) or heuristics (e.g., Busey, Tunnicliff, Loftus, & Loftus, 2000) may only be used when considering the accuracy of a decision. Thus, asking individuals to directly consider the evidence upon which a decision might be based may provide a more pure index of memory than would postdecision confidence. This finding has important implications for the understanding of the processes underlying confidence judgments and the temporal locus of the components involved.
Experiment 4
Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that confidence ratings could be used to discriminate between target and foil lineup stimuli. One of our major aims in Experiment 4 was to replicate these findings with different sets of stimulus materials (varying in difficulty). A second aim was to examine how robust the findings were when the context in which target stimuli were embedded varied.
It has been suggested that confidence estimates elicited using the new procedure primarily reflect comparisons of ecphoric similarity (i.e., similarity between presented items and memorial images). According to this view, the confidence rating elicited by a given stimulus is determined primarily by the properties of that stimulus. However, a large body of literature in psychophysics provides generally consistent support for the pervasiveness and generalizability of context effects. For example, studies of line length estimation (Krantz & Campbell, 1961) , weight (Sherif, Taub, & Hovland, 1958) , and the darkness and density of dot patterns (Mellers & Birnbaum, 1982) have all demonstrated that responses concerning a particular stimulus are influenced by the qualities of accompanying stimuli. Similar effects have been found for social comparison studies assessing facial expressions (Manis, 1971) and attractiveness (Geiselman et al., 1984) and for performance judgments (e.g., assessments of Olympic gymnastic routines; Damisch, Mussweiler, & Plessner, 2006) . Research also suggests that, in general, these effects are not dependent on response type, having been observed for tasks requiring both rating and category assignment responses. In sum, context effects have been reported for discrimination tasks, tasks involving face stimuli, and tasks requiring participants to respond using rating scales, making clear the relevance of this issue for the new procedure.
However, three streams of evidence prevent a clear prediction of context effects for the new procedure. First, although research in the eyewitness identification domain suggests that a plausible but innocent suspect has an increased chance of being incorrectly identified if presented alongside low similarity foils than if accompanied by high similarity foils (R. C. L. Lindsay & Wells, 1980; Tredoux, 2002) , support for the presence of context effects is not universal in the eyewitness identification literature (Gonzalez, Ellsworth, & Pembroke, 1993) . Second, although context effects have been demonstrated for a wide variety of response types, this finding is also not universal. Absolute magnitude estimation tasks require participants to translate sensory perceptions of stimulus intensity (e.g., brightness or loudness) onto a numerical scale, theoretically providing a direct measure of sensory magnitude. Studies requiring absolute magnitude estimations show little, if any, evidence of context effects (Ward, 1987; Zwislocki & Goodman, 1980) . If stimulus familiarity is viewed as a dimension of stimulus intensity, there appear to be obvious parallels between absolute magnitude estimations and the confidence estimates generated using the new procedure. Consequently, the fundamentally similar nature of absolute magnitude estimations and the confidence estimates generated by the new procedure may point to a similar insensitivity to context effects for the confidence procedure. Finally, Balakrishnan and Ratcliff (1996) reported little evidence of context effects for a task requiring participants to use confidence ratings to discriminate between and categorize lines of varying lengths. Thus, the extant literature makes no clear predictions about the likelihood of observing context effects for the new procedure. Similarly, no definite predictions can be made on the basis of the theories of confidence processing underlying this research. However, these theoretical perspectives raise a number of issues for consideration.
SDT-based theories assume that a comparison of the ecphoric similarity between a presented item and a memorial image of a previously presented item generates a value, which is then compared with a preset criterion to determine both response and response confidence. The balance of evidence hypothesis (Vickers, 1979) holds that evidence is accumulated in separate accumulators until a criterion is exceeded. At this point, evidence accumulation stops, a response is made, and confidence is determined by comparing the amount of evidence in the competing accumulators. Thus, for both theoretical accounts, criterion placement affects confidence processing. If changes in context lead to changes in criterion placement (Treisman & Faulkner, 1984; Treisman & Williams, 1984) , context would affect the confidence estimates generated using the new procedure. This, in turn, could affect classification accuracy using the new procedure. For accumulator models of confidence processing, there is an alternative explanation for any observed effect of context on confidence. The conceptualization of evidence put forward by accumulator models of confidence processing could easily be extended to include not only an assessment of ecphoric similarity but also confirming and/or disconfirming evidence afforded by contextual cues. It is important to note that although accumulator models of confidence processing can easily account for context effects, current models make no direct predictions about the likelihood of observing context effects in the present setting. Thus, the importance of context effects for the new procedure requires empirical investigation.
In Experiment 4, we examined the impact of context effects on the likelihood that a suspect (guilty or innocent) will be positively classified as the offender using the new procedure and compared the impact of context effects on classification performance for the confidence and binary decision conditions. For the purposes of this research, we conceptualized context as being akin to the degree to which lineup foils resemble the target (in terms of physical appearance) and attempted to manipulate context by manipulating foil similarity. Typically, in studies investigating the impact of foil similarity (e.g., Charman & Wells, 2007; R. C. L. Lindsay, 1994; Tredoux, 2002) , similarity is determined according to global similarity ratings made by independent judges comparing foils with a target stimulus. Similarly, in the present research, foil similarity was determined by independent judges (see the Method section). For the present purposes, operationalizing foil similarity in terms of physical resemblance to the target increases the likelihood that variations in foil similarity will vary the extent to which the suspect will stand out as a clear best match to a participant's memory of the target (Brewer et al., 2005) . Although foil similarity varied, it is important to note that target-absent suspect similarity to the target remained constant and, as described in the Method section, high. Given that confidence ratings elicited using the new procedure are thought to reflect comparisons of ecphoric similarity, varying foil similarity in this manner should effectively manipulate context and allow an investigation of the effect of context on the new procedure.
Method
Participants and apparatus. Four hundred eighty (198 men and 282 women) undergraduate students participated. Participant ages ranged from 16 to 58 years (M ϭ 20.9 years, SD ϭ 4.8). The presentation of stimuli and instructions and the recording of responses were all done in the same manner outlined for previous experiments.
Stimulus events. The stimulus movie clip for Experiment 4 depicted four young, Caucasian adults (two men and two women) entering, searching through, and removing items from a personal storage facility. From these four individuals, two targets (one man, one woman) were selected. The clip ran for 1 min 2 s, with views of the female target available from various angles for 29 s and views of the male target available from various angles for 18 s. Close-up views were available for 7 s and 5 s for the female and male targets, respectively.
Lineup stimuli. Photo display size was the same size as in the previous experiments. Each lineup consisted of eight faces, centered on the screen in two rows of four faces. Binary decision condition participants were also presented with a Not Present button at the bottom of the screen. All movie clips and lineup photos were obtained through databases held at Flinders University. A pool containing possible foil faces was assembled for each target. These faces were then rated for similarity to the target to construct high and low foil similarity lineups.
Pilot study: Similarity ratings. Similarity ratings were obtained from 67 undergraduate students. Participants were tested in groups of 10 to 20 individuals. After arriving at the laboratory, participants were seated at desks approximately 3-4 m from a projection screen. Participants were told they would view a series of pairs of faces. In each pair, the lineup version of the target face was presented on the left of screen with an accompanying face on the right. Participants provided a similarity rating ranging from 1 (extremely dissimilar) to 6 (extremely similar) for each pair. Each pair of faces was presented for 7 s, and participants were instructed to provide an estimation of general similarity. This process was then repeated for a second target. Participants viewed 45 pairs of faces for the female target and 28 pairs of faces for the male target.
Accompanying faces all matched a general description of the relevant target.
Mean (and standard deviation) similarity ratings were calculated for each accompanying face for both targets. For each target, the accompanying face with the highest mean similarity rating was selected as the target's replacement, or designated suspect, for target-absent lineups. For both targets, high and low similarity lineups were constructed, ensuring that the highest similarity rating for a member of the low similarity lineup was significantly lower than the lowest similarity rating for a member of the high similarity lineup, t(67) ϭ Ϫ7.09, p Ͻ .05, d ϭ 1.05, and t(67) ϭ Ϫ3.94, p Ͻ .05, d ϭ 0.64, for Targets 1 and 2, respectively.
4 For the female target, the mean similarity ratings were 3.31 (SD ϭ 0.27) and 1.62 (SD ϭ 0.12) for the high and low similarity conditions, respectively. For the male target, the mean similarity ratings for the high and low conditions were 2.86 (SD ϭ 0.35) and 1.70 (SD ϭ 0.08). The mean similarity ratings for the high similarity groups are around the midpoint, rather than the upper end, of the rating scale. However, it should also be noted that the values of this ratings scale have no absolute value and, hence, no reference point that denotes high similarity. Thus, despite reliable differences in the mean similarity ratings between conditions, it is difficult to assess the strength of the high similarity manipulation.
Design and procedure. Experiment 4 had a 2 (condition: confidence vs. binary decision) ϫ 2 (target presence: target present vs. target absent) ϫ 2 (foil similarity: high vs. low) ϫ 2 (target) between-subjects design. Participants were randomly allocated to a condition, with 30 participants in each condition.
Participants arrived at the lab, were seated in individual cubicles, and viewed a simulated crime movie clip on a computer screen. After viewing a 15-min distracter movie clip, participants were presented with an eight-member simultaneous lineup. Binary decision condition participants completed a standard eyewitness identification task, clicking the picture of the lineup member they believed to be the offender or clicking a Not Present button to indicate that they believed the lineup was target absent. After making their identification decision, participants were required to provide a confidence estimate in the accuracy of their decision. As in Experiment 3, confidence group participants were asked to provide a confidence estimate, ranging from 0 to 100%, for each lineup member that reflected their belief that said lineup member was the offender.
Results
As for Experiments 2 and 3, four classification criteria were developed from and applied to the confidence group data to determine overall accuracy (see Table 9 ). Separate criteria were calculated for each target and for data collapsed across targets. No difference was found between the four criteria, 2 (1, N ϭ 480) ϭ 0.01-0.03, w ϭ 0.01-0.03, and, in the interest of consistency, C3 (max -M others ) was selected for comparison with the results of the binary decision group. Critical values for the male target were 77.14, 95.00, and 77.14 for data collapsed across similarity conditions and for the high and low similarity conditions, respectively. For the female target, the critical value was 100 for the high and low similarity conditions and for data collapsed across similarity conditions. For data collapsed across targets, the critical values for data collapsed across similarity conditions and for the high and low similarity conditions were 93.57, 95.00, and 86.43, respectively. Separate 2 (condition) ϫ 2 (similarity) ϫ 2 (accuracy) hierarchical log linear analyses compared classification accuracy for target-present and target-absent lineups. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 10 .
When data were collapsed across targets for target-present lineups, a small but significant effect of similarity demonstrated greater accuracy for low similarity than high similarity conditions, 2 (1, N ϭ 240) ϭ 4.52, w ϭ 0.13. The small but significant effect of condition on accuracy, 2 (1, N ϭ 240) ϭ 7.68, w ϭ 0.18, suggested an advantage for the binary decision condition over the confidence procedure in target-present lineups. A weak and nonsignificant Condition ϫ Similarity interaction indicated that for target-present trials, similarity did not differentially affect classification accuracy between conditions, 2 (1, N ϭ 240) ϭ 0.19, w ϭ 0.08. For target-absent lineups, consistent with the results reported for Experiment 3, the significant effect of condition on accuracy, 2 (1, N ϭ 240) ϭ 23.76, w ϭ 0.34, indicated improved classification accuracy for the confidence procedure compared with the binary decision condition. The effect of similarity and the Condition ϫ Similarity interaction were nonsignificant, 2 (1, N ϭ 240) ϭ 0.03, w ϭ 0.01, and 2 (1, N ϭ 240) ϭ 0.01, w ϭ 0.01, respectively.
Consistent with the analyses for data collapsed across targets, analysis of the male target target-present data found small but significant effects of similarity and condition on accuracy, (1, N ϭ 120) ϭ 0.96, w ϭ 0.06, respectively. For the female target, no significant effects were found between conditions for target-present trials, whereas for target-absent trials, a small but significant effect of condition indicated superior classification accuracy for the confidence procedure compared with the standard task, 2 (1, N ϭ 120) ϭ 8.89, w ϭ 0.27. The effect of similarity and the Condition ϫ Similarity interaction were nonsignificant,
2
(1, N ϭ 120) ϭ 0.05, w ϭ 0.01, and 2
(1, N ϭ 120) ϭ 3.61, w ϭ 0.07, respectively. Despite a pattern of results for targetabsent trials in line with previous findings, the most striking feature of Note. Prop ϭ proportion correct. a n ϭ 30.
the accuracy results for the female target is the poor target-present accuracy for both the binary decision and the confidence conditions. Although poor positive identification performance is a persistent characteristic of the female target data in the present study, these results are consistent with previous work using this target stimulus. 5 Further, despite the difficulty of the task, target-absent accuracy for the confidence group was encouraging. This may reflect an overly conservative classification criterion for the confidence group. However, the poorer target-absent performance for the binary decision condition was accompanied by target-present accuracy below chance level. Thus, the results obtained for the female target suggest that the promising target-absent accuracy for the confidence group came at little cost to target-present accuracy, compared with the binary decision condition.
Consistent with previously reported results, despite encouraging target-absent accuracy, target-present accuracy for the confidence procedure was low. In addition to the low accuracy proportions reported, the actual numbers of correct positive identifications for the confidence procedure were also troubling. However, targetpresent accuracy was also low for the binary decision condition. In an effort to make more effective use of the confidence data provided by the confidence procedure and consequently improve classification performance, we applied the hierarchical algorithm to confidence group participants' confidence estimates. The hierarchical algorithm was developed separately for each target and for data collapsed across targets and applied in a manner identical to that described for Experiment 3. As in Experiment 3, separate critical values were determined for suspect and foil max confidence ratings. The critical values for suspect max confidence estimates for the male target were 4, 4, and 10 for data collapsed across similarity conditions and for the high and low similarity conditions, respectively. For the female target, the corresponding critical values were 30, 45, and 30. For data collapsed across targets, the critical suspect max values were identical to those reported for the male target data. The critical values for foil max confidence estimates for the male target were 20, 40, and 10 for data collapsed across similarity conditions and for the high and low similarity conditions, respectively. For the female target, the corresponding critical values were 70, 75, and 90. For data collapsed across targets, the corresponding critical suspect foil max values were 70, 40, and 70.
Consistent with the results reported for Experiment 3, compared with C3, the hierarchical algorithm again enhanced target-present accuracy (37% vs. 13% overall). Further, although there is an apparent drop in target-absent accuracy associated with the application of the hierarchical algorithm (66% vs. 90% overall), indeterminate responses accounted for over 80% of these "noncorrect" classifications. The hierarchical algorithm resulted in an incorrect identification in less than 6% of target-absent trials when data were collapsed across targets. For the individual targets, the innocent suspect identification rate ranged from 0 to 10%. Thus, in all cases, the hierarchical algorithm was again able to increase the rate of correct identifications without inflating the incorrect identification rate.
Before we compare classification accuracy using the hierarchical algorithm with the binary decision condition, one aspect of our treatment of the binary decision condition data for this experiment must be noted. Unlike Experiment 3, Experiment 4 used designated innocent suspects. However, although target-absent choosing rates for the binary decision condition ranged from 32 to 40%, the designated innocent suspect was only identified twice out of 120 target-absent trials (collapsed across targets). Thus, a more realistic estimate of target-absent suspect identification rates is provided by the procedure described for Experiment 3 (i.e., dividing the total number of foil identifications by the number of lineup members to estimate the rate of innocent suspect identifications). Following the logic outlined previously, binary decision condition foil identifications were treated as lineup rejections. This method of calculating target-absent suspect identification rates produced results consistent with Experiment 3 (see Table 11 ). Compared with the binary decision condition, the confidence group hierarchical algorithm provides improved target-present accuracy with equivalent or superior target-absent performance.
As for the previously reported experiments, accuracy was analyzed according to classification type. When analyzing accuracy according to classification, we again used the total number of foil identifications divided by the number of lineup members to estimate the innocent suspect identification rate. Table 12 contains the accuracy rates for choosers and nonchoosers in both the confidence and the binary decision conditions. The general pattern of results differs slightly from the results reported for Experiment 3. Despite a general decrease relative to the results reported in Experiment 3, the nonchooser accuracy rates suggest a slight advantage for the confidence condition compared with the binary decision group. Consistent with previous results, chooser accuracy for the hierarchical algorithm again compares well with the accuracy for the binary decision group. Although some cells suggest an advantage for the binary decision group in proportion correct, in general the hierarchical algorithm increases the number of correct positive responses with no cost to overall proportion correct.
Discussion
In sum, using stimulus materials that produced a difficult identification task, Experiment 4 replicates the findings reported for Experiment 3 regarding the accessibility and diagnostic value of the evidential basis for recognition decisions (in the absence of a binary response) in an eyewitness identification paradigm. Further, Experiment 4 provides a general replication of the classification accuracy results reported for Experiment 3, thereby satisfying the first aim of the study. The application of the hierarchical algorithm produced notable superiority, compared with the initial criterion (C3), in classification accuracy for the confidence group. Further, classification performance using the hierarchical algorithm again compared well with a stringent binary decision condition in comparisons of accuracy according to both trial type and classification. Finally, Experiment 4 again demonstrated effective confidence group classification using a between-subjects classification criterion.
Experiment 4 also aimed to manipulate foil similarity and investigate the effect of context on the confidence estimates elicited using the confidence procedure. There was no evidence of a differential effect of context on classification performance for the binary decision and confidence conditions. However, although there was some evidence to suggest a successful manipulation (e.g., main effects of context on target-present accuracy for the male target and for data collapsed across targets), these effects were not consistent across trial types and individual targets. The low rate of innocent suspect identifications for the binary decision group suggests that the manipulation may have been constrained by (a) the use of insufficiently plausible innocent suspects or (b) the method of foil selection for target-absent lineups (see Clark & Tunnicliff, 2001 ). Further, similarity ratings are highly idiosyncratic (Tredoux, 2002) , and even though two lineups may be constructed so that the faces in each lineup differ significantly from the faces in the other according to ratings of similarity, these ratings may (a) differ significantly for some raters but not for others and (b) say nothing about how the lineup will be perceived as a gestalt.
General Discussion
Current eyewitness identification test practices operate in and contribute to an environment in which a witness' decision can be shaped by a variety of factors that contribute to mistaken identifications of innocent suspects and failures to identify the actual perpetrator. Without a precise independent indicator of identification accuracy, the validity of any particular identification decision is questionable. In four experiments, we examined a new procedure for using eyewitness confidence to determine whether a face seen at test was Note. Prop ϭ proportion correct. a n ϭ 30. the same as the one seen at encoding. Confidence judgments (rather than yes-no recognition decisions) were used in an attempt to gain a direct assessment of the degree of match between a presented and a previously seen face. Across a variety of recognition task paradigms, classification accuracy using multiple confidence estimates compared favorably with the accuracy of a binary decision condition. Although targetpresent accuracy for the new procedure was worse than accuracy in a binary decision condition for Experiments 1, 2, and 4 but equivalent for Experiment 3, all experiments found large advantages in target-absent classification performance for the new procedure, using simple classification criteria, whether criteria were calculated between or within subjects. The tendency for the confidence procedure to offer enhanced target-absent classification accuracy (both compared with target-present performance and compared with target-absent accuracy for the binary response condition) can be attributed to the nature of the algorithms used. In an effort to combat the well-documented problem of mistaken identifications, we designed our algorithms to be conservative when making positive classifications. In contrast, much experimental evidence suggests the typical witness is not so conservative (Wells, 1993) .
Additionally, in the later experiments (Experiments 3 and 4), a more sophisticated classification algorithm produced targetpresent accuracy rates superior to the rates produced in a binary decision condition with little cost to target-absent accuracy. Further, although Experiment 4 fails to clearly outline the effect of context on classification performance using the confidence procedure, it is important to note that it does, when combined with Experiment 3, demonstrate consistent patterns of results across stimulus sets producing identification tasks of markedly different levels of difficulty.
When deciding whether to positively identify a lineup member, a witness may be swayed by the perceived pressure to choose inherent in the identification test environment, thereby producing false identifications if the suspect is innocent. However, witnesses also frequently reject target-present lineups (Pike et al., 2002; Steblay, Dysart, Fulero, & Lindsay, 2001) . Although incorrect rejections are often underemphasized when eyewitness identification inaccuracy is addressed, the failure of eyewitnesses to make positive identifications from target-present lineups is a significant concern. An incorrect rejection may lead to the wrongful release of an offender and may also impede police investigations by erroneously suggesting that the initial suspect was not the perpetrator. The accuracy of the hierarchical algorithm suggests that examining multiple confidence estimates may provide an effective method of identifying a target among foils, even when a traditional procedure may leave a witness unable or unwilling to make a positive identification.
In addition to its direct contribution to understanding eyewitness memory, this research contributes in three ways to the general literature and, especially, to theorizing about meta-memory processes. First, it provides an initial step toward a theoretical understanding of the accessibility of the evidence upon which recognition decisions are made. Further, this research goes beyond previous meta-memory research (e.g., on the feeling of knowing in recall memory; Koriat, 1993 Koriat, , 1995 to show that such evidence can be accessed and used (in the absence of a binary response) to discriminate previously seen from unseen items in varied recognition memory task paradigms. Thus, this research advances metamemory theorizing. Second, it illustrates how basic theory, designed to account for simple decision-making phenomena, can inform understanding in more complex and applied decisionmaking domains. Finally, it suggests that alternative approaches may provide more sensitive indices of people's memory than are provided by typical binary judgments.
Thus, this research lends support to a large body of literature reporting the successful application of rating scales to psychophysics discrimination tasks and suggests that methods similar to the confidence procedure may be useful for those investigating decision making in a variety of applied domains. For example, in policing (e.g., police assessments of the probative value of particular evidence such as DNA and fingerprints), in the courtroom (e.g., jurors' assessments of defendant guilt), and in medical settings (e.g., diagnoses and prognoses), the apparent consequences of deciding on a particular response category may influence the decision-making process and reduce the fidelity with which the eventual decision or judgment reflects the information upon which it is based. In such cases, just as Cooke (1906) noted when discussing the problems associated with categorical weather forecasts, although the definition offered by binary decisions may be appealing, probabilistic scales may offer a more "scientific and honest" (p. 23) method of responding.
At first glance, the use of simultaneous lineup presentation appears to be a potential limitation of the present research. When viewing a simultaneous lineup (where all lineup members are presented at the same time), witnesses have a tendency to compare lineup members for relative similarity to their memory of the culprit and select the lineup member who best resembles their memory (R. C. L. Lindsay & Wells, 1985) . It is important to note that if the culprit is not present in the lineup, this decision strategy will often lead to errors, as in many cases one lineup member will still provide a match to the witness's memory superior to other lineup members. Witness reliance on relative judgments has been implicated as a major cause of mistaken identifications (Wells et al., 1998) . Thus, it could be argued that the use of simultaneous lineup presentation in Experiments 2, 3, and 4 may have increased witness reliance on relative judgments that, in turn, may have may have compromised the hypothesized relationship between confidence and ecphoric similarity. However, for two reasons, the simultaneous presentation of lineup stimuli is actually an important strength of these experiments. First, from an empirical point of view, the superior performance of participants using the confidence procedure over the performance of participants using the standard simultaneous lineup suggests that even if confidence ratings were based on comparisons between stimuli and were consequently compromised as indices of ecphoric similarity, the algorithms were sufficiently robust to overcome such distortion. Second, this superiority provides support for our theoretical rationale for the confidence procedure itself. Specifically, the problem with relative judgments is not that witnesses compare lineup members and classify one as the best match to their memory; rather, the problem lies in the fact that witnesses decide to choose the best match when it is not appropriate. As our procedure does not require (or even allow) participants to make an identification decision, the biases that potentially lead to these inappropriate relative identification decisions were avoided or, at least, ameliorated.
Although such discussion seems premature at present, it is worth noting that, should the confidence procedure prove suitable for use in the applied setting, it would change the nature of identification evidence submitted in court. The conventional, "clear-cut" witness identification would be replaced by a more probabilistic piece of evidence. The level of confidence or pattern of confidence estimates required to merit prosecution and the persuasiveness of such information on juror decision making (cf. Tenney, MacCoun, Spellman, & Hastie, 2007) would be issues for future investigation.
Across varied recognition tasks, encoding and test stimuli, and different degrees of encoding and test stimulus match, the general pattern of results remained relatively constant. It is important to note that results were consistent whether classification criteria were calculated between or within subjects. These encouraging findings, although not guaranteeing the existence of a comprehensive algorithm, do enhance the chances of identifying such an algorithm and suggest that further investigation is merited. This research is an important first step in an investigation of the potential applied utility of confidence estimates in the forensic setting.
